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which it helps defme.b To do so, it will ackhess the
relationship between the 00TW concept and RMO
model, the concept of war underlying AirLand Battle
doctrine and 00TW as a flawed concept. It further
argues that the RMO model should be replaced by
not one, but two new politico-military models as a
doctrinal bridge. It is not within this article’s scope
to attempt to create these models, which should
reflect recognized differences in current Western
and emerging non–Western approaches to warfare.
Rather, its purpose is to call attention to a need for
interim models to address AirLand Battle future
concepts. For this to occur, however, long-held US
political perceptions must change. As a result, the
revolution in military affairs (RMA) concept must be
broadened to include a political dimension.

HE US ARMY’S AirLand Battle doctrine is
significant in the historical evolution of warfighting doctrine. 1 Since its doctrinal inception in
the August 1982 edition of US Army Field Manual
(FM) 100-5, Operations, and the FM revisions in
May 1986 to include follow-on force int.diction and
operational maneuver, AirLand Battle doctrine has
helped tmnsform the US Army into a modem land
warfare force qualitatively second to none in the
world.2
To maintain the Army’s land warfare dominance,
the June 1993 edition of FM 10&5 documents the
Cold War’s end, emphasizes shifting to a joint operations focus and anticipates the US need for a
force-projection Army in a rapidly changing world.3
The inclusion of the operations other than war
(OOTW) concept in the new FM 100-5 is regarded
as vital to operations doctrine because it broadens
the Army’s mission capability across the operational continuum.4 The 00TW concept, however, is
flawed.5
This article challenges the concept and, by default,
the contiiuum shown in Figure 1 and the range of
military operations in the theater strategic environment (hereafter referred to as the RMO model),

The 00TW Concept and RMO Model
The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 introduced the
concept of contingency operations, an early foren.mner of 00TW. Contingency operations dealt primarily with urgent situations and crises below the level
of general war but which nq.hd
armed force to
support national policy in a Cold War environment.
These operations requixed either light or heavy Army
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forces and fimctioned within a strategic paradigm
designed to prevent the global spread of cornmunism.7 The 00TW concept introduced in 1993
expanded on the contingency operations concept,
bringing it fully into the post-Cold War world, which
requires more of such operations.
The continuum of military operations depicted in
F@n3 1 portrays three environmental states: war,
conflict and peace.8 00TW resides in both the conflict and peacetime states. War, however, resides
only in the war environmental state. The US Army’s
requirement in such a state is to fight and win.9
Under the OOTW concept, which seeks to overcome the problematic nature of the term low–
intensity conjlict (LIC), US Army forces are deployed to resolve regional conflicts and directly deter
war. 10 According to Colonel Steven M. Butler, former director, low–intensity conflict proponencies,
“Problems with the term LIC have been recognized
for several years. It is distinguished from war not by
intensity of violence but by a difference in purpose
and method. Some such conflicts may be quite violent. However, the goal is to resolve apolitical problem by political means, with the minimum necessary
use of military force.” This concept also includes
peacetime operations, such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and counterdrug efforts, which the
US Army has increasingly found itself asked to perform in support of national objectives to promote
global peace. ]1
In the military operations continuum, peace is
considenxl to be the normal condition among and
within nations. The maintenance or r-e-establishment
of peace is sought by means of national influence,
suasion and, if need be, coercion by the United States
in its foreign and defense policies. This process is
not discussed in the 1993 FM 100-5, yet it is implicit
in the OOTW concept, as depicted in Figure 2.12
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This political perception regarding the primacy of
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government’s natural order. This view, however, is
fundamental flawed when applied outside Western
civilization. 1J
Even as the US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) was developing the RMO
model to reflect post-Cold War realities, military and
academic perceptions of the global security environment changed. Scholars increasingly recognized
that war is no longer the exclusive domain of the
nation–state. 14
A qualitatively different war form has developed,
challenging the central tenets of how modem warfare is conducted by armies in the West in general
and by the United States in particular. These central
tenets are structurally built upon technological dominance in military equipment. The non-Western form
of warfare eschews such technology. Modem warfare is undergoing a simultaneous metamorphosis
based on information and advanced technologies
that will result in a qualitatively new form of Western
warfare.
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Depibying US ;ombatfo;es
with the expec@ilm of stopping conventional war k
unrealistic because k many cases, an indigenous infrastructure no longer exists to suppoti
kuge-scale combat operations. One example is Somalia, where nothing even remotely resembling Western conventiimal fomes couki have been jiekkd by the waning pmtiks.
In many cases, a st@? of war based on rwn-Westem polilical conditibns+libal
and
religibus domhumce or conjlikt between subnatiorud and lbcal groups4eady
exists. . . .
Doctrinally, these potentialities are not even considered Embracing the 00TW concept thus
concedes the political and mili@y initiative to the opponent, who is thereby initiidly
pendkd to condkct non-Western mdikuy opemtkms again@ US fomes.

While the 00TW concept can be viewed as a bold
and important shitl in emerging US Army doctrine
based on’’... reftig the understanding of how to use
military force, “ its perception of the non–Western
conflict environment is inaccurate and inherently
flawed. 15 The 00TW concept became official
Army doctrine with the publication of the 1993 FM
100-5, but by May 1994, it had almdy become disctiited. “The next edition of FM 10&5, Operations. . . [will] . . . describe the seductively flawed
distinction between war and operations other than
“lb Before we can explore this conceptual flaw,
~~concept of war underlying AirLand Battle doctrine must be addressed.

US Army Concept of War
The US Army’s concept of war is based fully on
the traditional Western definition, Clausewitzian in
origin, which views war as an extension of politics
by other means. 17 Under this definition, war is con-
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ventional; the nation-state, or coalition of nationstates, is the wielder of political violence; and nationalism fbels ideology. Ww’s puqmse in this context is
to preserve and extend national sovereignty. 18
This definition of war is a product of the historical
period when it was developed. Carl von Clausewitz’s On War skillfidly explains the monumental
militaxy and political changes in European society
after the French Revolution. Clausewitz’s definition
of war fit hand-in-glove with the new deftition of
wealth developed in 1776 by Adam Smith in Wealth
of Nations. Together, these two works accurately described the shift, albeit at times temporally extendd
in European society after the demise of the ancien
n?gime in France and the rise of the nation-state. *9
This traditional definition of war has pnmi.ikxi for
mo~ than 150 years and has worked well throughout
the 19th century, during World Wars I and II, during
the Korean War and as a basis for possible confrontation with the Warsaw Pact in central Europe. Con-
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ventional military operations that are based on traditional Clausewitzian objectives seek to destroy
opposing military forces, seim territory and capture
another nation–state’s leadership to obtain decisive
victory.20 The Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine and
armored and mechanized force structure is based on
t.hk definition of war. 21 while the US Army still has
a significant light infantry mission capability, it
would be de-emphasized if the Army’s combat role
and mission were focused solely on armored and
mechanized combat as part of its downsizing.22

00TW’S Conceptual Flaw
The 00TW concept’s fundamental flaw is that it
is based on—and is a derivative of—the Army’s
Clausewitzian definition of war. It is a definition
now seriously challenged by recent historical events
and military scholarship.23
As a result, one can infer that the US Army, and in
turn the defense establishment, is inadvertently using
a Western concept of war to form the basis of military organization and policy in a rapidly changing
world that now bears little resemblance to the world
of the Clausewitzian paradigm.”
It is no coincidence that the decades-old Western economic paradigm is also being seriously challenged with reengineering concepts. It can be argued that what curnmt
Army doctrine defines as a conflict environmental
state for 00TW is actually a non–Western war environmental state, as portrayed in Figure 3. This can be
viewed as “a blurring of the distinction between war
and operations other than war.”25
This non–Western war environmental state has its
origins in the past and can be viewed in many
resp@s as a means by which the militarily weak can
challenge the militarily strong. However, in the
Oriental tradition of war, as seen in Sun Tzu’s writings, this is not always the case. 26 Best thought of as
a form of “militaty Akido,” the greater strength of an
opposing force is used against it by an enemy well
versed in deception, indirect fighting methods and
flexibility. US Special Operations Forces (SOF)
understand this form of warfare. However, because
it is the “other fbture warkue” that is developing,
instead of the RMA-based one, SOF’S future contributions have been generally overlooked.27
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Traditionally based in agricultural settings in the
20th century and usually linked in modem military
literature to Lin Piao and Mao Tke-Tung, this evolving form of warfare has blended with terrorism and

Instiad of a stnukgic asse~ as
jidurkt$ Alvin and Heti To~r have suggested, information technology is more oflen
an Achilles heel of Western (and speclfially
US) anniks. News media broaakasts are ofien
used as effective politkal took by nuli@ily
weak opponents. CNN real-time pictures of
body bags, fig-draped
cofins and injured
and dying US servicemen and local civilians
greatly injluencepublic opinwn and pose
signljicantpmbk?ms for US laden.

the urbanization of the less-developed world to
create something new. “The future killing grounds
in the less-developed world will not be the impenetrable forests or remote mountain areas where
guerrilla wars have traditionally been fought, but
the crowded, built-up areas in and around the less–
developed world’s burgeoning urban centers.”x
While the geographical context of this emerging
form of war is changing, it is the recognition that it is
an environmental state of war, not of conflict, that is
important. Such a ndity destroys the whole concept
behind 00TW, which seeks to avoid conventional
war in a crisis situation and return the environment
back to peace. The American use of suasion in such
a scenario to deter war and resolve conflict is totally
inappropriate.29
In fact, deploying US combat forces with the expectation of stopping conventional war is unrealistic
because in many cases, an indigenous infrastructure
no longer exists to support large-scale combat operations. One example is Somali% where nothing even
remotely resembling Western conventional forces
could have been fielded by the warring parties.30
More important, however, is the fact that in many
cases, a state of war based on non–Western political
conditions—tribal and religious dominance or conflict between subnational and local groups-a.lmdy
exists. Because the warb is not between states, such
conditions are often overlookd.
Doctrinally, these
potentialities are not even considered. Embracing
the OOTW concept thus concedes the political and
military inhtive to the opponen~ who is thereby initially permitted to conduct non–Western military
operations against US forces. It is of little wonder,
37

UUimately,the West%vulnembilily in
this regani k best understood by remembering
that in an @riiibn waq a local warkwd knows
he can affoti to lose hundkedi of sokiim,
unkke a US Army commande~ who sltzndk to
f~e a huge public outcry back home if
US casudies are high.

then, that most recent experiences under 00TW’S
mbric have been political and militay failures.
Arguments against the existence of such non–
Western military operations can be easily made
because they conflict with traditional W=tem opemtional pnxepts. Such arguments can be made inelevang however, because what ultimately matters is the
outcQme of an operation-the prognxs toward a defined political end-not the form the operation takes.
Four operational characteristics support this line of
inning
about the existence of such non-Wwtem
warfare operations:
� The denial of red-time information to Western
military forces.
� The use of real-time information against Western governments.
� Nonacceptance of Western laws governing war.
. The ability to defeat advanced Western weaponry.
The fnt two characteristics directly neutralize the
West’s superior information-based systems and permit the use of local knowledge as a political tool
against the West. Non-Western combatants are deployed within the general populace, negating Western
intelligence gathering from satellite imagery and
remote sensing. For effective intelligence gathering to be conducted under these circumstances, labor–
intensive human intelligence is ~uimd.s 1
Due to ineffective local intelligence–gathering
capabilities, military commanders are unable to
obtain a battlefield picture of enem troops as they
would on a conventional battlefield. J 2 Non-Western
combatants are thus able to effectively frustrate
Western forces by spreading out across the battlefield
to reduce their vulnerability while using a relatively
high organic and inherent stealth capability to mist
Western detection. In Somali% as in other non–
Western scenarios, it was almost impossible to distinguish civilians from insurgents.33
Instead of a strategic asset, as futurists Alvin and
Heidi Toffler have suggested, information technology is mom often an Achilles heel of Western (and
specifically US) armies.~ News media broadcasts
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ate often used as effective political tools by militarily
weak opponents. CNN real-time picture of body
bags, flag-draped coffins and injured and dying US
servicemen and local civilians gwtly influence public opinion and pose significant problems for US
leaders. Given the graphic footage now transmi~
this is mo~ true today than during the Vietnam War.
In a nxent broadcast from Haiti, a machete attack
victim’s blood splattend a television camera lens.35
Local warloxxis and digious factional heads understand these images’ effectiveness. The sensationalized deaths of even a small number of US servicemen, such as the Rangers in Somali% can erode
political support for military operations.36
The third characteristic is a denunciation of Western ideals and the portrayal of Western civility as a
weakness.37 Because they ofkm place a much different value on human life than the indigenous combatants do, Western forces are constrained by ethical
inhibitions against indiscriminate killing. For example, women and childnm were used to shield military
objectives in Somalia and to carry suicide bombs in
Vietnam.38 Dead US servicemen being dragged
through the street in Somalia and American prisoners of war on public display in Iraq are other examples of such propaganda.39
Ultimately, the West’s vulnerability in this rega.d
is best understood by nmembering that in an attrition war, a local warlord knows he can tiord to lose
hundreds of soldiem, unlike a US Army commander,
who stands to face a huge public outcry back home
if US casualties are high.
The fourth characteristic denies the West its military advantage based on advanced weaponry. The
immense advantages offered by precision-guided
munitions and air– and submarine-launched cruise
missiles in a conventional setting are lost in environments when target acquisition is irrelevant and targets can be destroyed more effectively by other
means. Furthermore, urban battlefields and other
forms of restrictive terrain, such as jungles and
mountainous countrysides, have historically been
great equalizers of military forces.
Together, these non–Western operational characteristics erode many components of Western dominance in warfare because they require manpower–
intensive operations rather than the technology–
intensive operations the West relies on. Manpower–
intensive operations often ~sult in high casualties,
making them politically unacceptable.
In time,
advances in intelligent robotic systems, weaponry,
individual soldier protection and informational
technologies will overcome this disadvantage for
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l%e 00TWconceptkjknved
nature highlights thejhct thdthe C’kUWWi&ZUI view
of the traditiimul baitlefild, where decisive viktiry impossible, k now mpiiily becoming obsolkte
in con.icts against non-Western foes who possess many notiitiorud
advan@ges over the WesL
But many Western and Western-inspired s~s are still conducting war in the tmdiliimalsense.

Western security forces in non–Western milita~
environments. In the interim, however, a growing
number of conflicts with non–Western peoples—
which are conceived as other–than-war military
operations-wars
are actually being waged and unwittingly lost by the West.m
Current Army doctrine does not recognize this
fact, because it is generally outside of long–held US
political and military perceptions. These perceptions
view war, and hence the possibility of either political
victory or defeat, as existing solely within the legitimate domain of the nation–state. This is in line with
former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik when they state,
“Any use of America’s information-age Army in a
situation in which one or more of the parties axe using
violence to compel othm to do their will nx@res that
we approach the situation as war and mquims very
strong civil-military and interagency links.”41

DoctrinalSuggestions
The 00TW concept’s flawed nature highlights
the fact that the Clausewitzian view of the tradi-
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tional battlefield, where decisive victory is possible,
is now rapidly becoming obsolete in conflicts against
non–Western foes who possess many nontraditional
advantages over the W=t. But many Western and
Western-inspired states am still conducting war in the
traditional sense. As a result, I suggest that two new
politico-military models, one radical and one traditional, be created for the follow--m edition to the
1993 FM 100-5. These models would serve as an
interim bridge to help facilitate the Army’s development of a capabilities-lwed 21st-century warflghting doctrine.42
The radical politic~military
model should be
based on a “non-Western warfare model,” which
conceptually btis
with the “war, conflict and peacetime” continuum of military operations. This model
would be based on the premise that wark
will be a
constant and endemic condition for opemtions in the
majority of non–Western environments where the US
Army will operate in the future-a
non–Western
world where conflict and war represent the new natural order of government. This realization conflicts
directly with the politically based 00’TW principle of
39

legitimacy, whose ”... intent is to assist the legitimate
regional governments to become self–sufficient,
stable and peaceful neighbors.”43 It would conceptually draw upon some of Martin van Cnweld’s
arguments in K& Trmq-forrnation of War.U
The failure of the Western form of the nation–state
to take hold in much of the non–Western world and

Until USpolit&dpemepli@ns change, the
US Army will be handicapped in its attempts
tocometi gr@swith mdilary operations in
non-West4?m environments Once these
political perceptions do change, ourperceptbns concerning “legitimate government”
must also change, because the [Clausewitzian] perceptin of the natibn-state k
monopoly on war will be sh@ered

the increasing rise of tribalism based on religious and
ethnic groups should be the centerpiece of this
model. The model must address how a technologically intensive West can efkctively operate in military environments requiring manpower-intensive
operations in which the West is at ethical and economic disadvantages. Organized criminal groups
m another faction which must be taken into consideration,45 Possibly, it will be determined that the
price for attempting to obtain real political success in
such environments-creating
the conditions for lasting peace —is currently too high a cost in American
lives and economic resources to justify repeated
interventions.
This means we will only treat the secondary
effects of strife, not the root causes, by means of
short-duration and limited+bjective operations.ti
These are operations which would be carried out
only in direct support of well-defined national security objectives based on coherent foreign and defense
policies —which the current pnxidential administrations have not yet established.47
Further, because current US Army doctrine is so
bound to Clausewitzian though~ many doctrinal questions such as “Have the principles of war changed?,”
“What is victory?” and “What is the battlefield?”
must be reexamined. Questions regarding force
stmcture, such as those focusing on the development
of special division–size military police units, must
also be M&wed as this model is developed.~
The traditional Politicmmilitary model, based on
a derivation of the current RMO model where peace
represents the natural order, would be developed for

40

US Army operations in Western industrial societies
and non-Western influenced states whose methods of
waging war are similar to our own. This model would
enable the Army to continue to operate effectively in
a modem conventional warfare setting as it did during the Gulf War. The model should also incorporate
enough flexibility to address the likely threat of
nuclear-armed outlaw states such as North Korea.
The creation of two models, a molutionaiy nonClausewitzian one for operations in the non–Western
world and a traditional Clausewitzian model for
operations in the Western and Western-influenced
world, should be considered a conceptual bridge to
facilitate Army doctrinal and force-stmctum reforms.
Western warfare is ultimately changing because of
the emergence of advanced information and weapons technology embodied in the RMA and will
require the development of a non-clausewitzian
model in the future. A single model based on non–
Clausewitzian concepts and encompassing Western
and non–Western approaches to warfare is m@red
to ftiy
support US Army follow-on doctrine to
AirLand Battle in the 21st century.49
Such an encompassing politico-military model
cannot be created now, however, because new modes
of emerging Western and non–Western warfare, and
the political changes they will bring, are still in their
infancy. Further, the US Army needs time to prepare
for the massive institutional shock the break with the
Clausewitzian paradigm will ultimately bring.
Wkh the 00TW concept’s abandonment, the initial development of post<lausewitzian operational
constructs and the creation of interim warfighting
doctrine based on two politico-military models will
help the US Army achieve its ultimate vision: creatingan information-age Army to protect and defend
America’s vital interests in the 21st century.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5, Fome XXI Operations, was published in August 1994. Although it has
many innovative concepts, Force XXI Operations
still follows conventional Army wisdom, which
places 00TW in the environmental state of conflict-not
war. The pamphlet does break new
ground by viewing such conflict as existing outside
of current Western paradigmsoso Still, this inability
to substitute war for conflict is problematic. It Esults
from TRADOC’s being subordinate to US government policy, which only recognizes the legitimate
use of “political violence” by the nation–state or
coalition of nation–states.
Herein lies the dilemma. Until US political perceptions change, the US Army will be handicapped
in its attempts to come to grips with mili~
opera-
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tions in non–Western environments.
Once these
political perceptions do change, our perceptions concerning “legitimate government” must also change,
because the perception of the nation–state’s monopoly on war will be shattered.
Because of this, the simultaneous rise of non–
Western warfare and the RMA must now be viewed
together as bringing about a “Revolution in Political

and Military Affairs.” Hence, it is foreseen that
our government will be ~uimd to undergo significant changes just as surely as the Army defending it.
As a prerequisite of this change, closer integration
of US foreign and defense policies is necessary.
Only then can the suggestions for AirLand Battle doctrinal reform outlined in this article be successfidly
implemented. MR
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